It hasn't really appeared yet on the street side propaganda posters but this can't be far off. It is now the cornerstone of what China's leader is doing. Under this banner, targeting tax evasion by the wealthy makes more sense, as do moves to make education more equitable by banning private tutoring companies. The ongoing crackdown on the country's tech giants can also be seen as part of the plan.
So does Xi Jinping really believe in this idea of a communist project? As a comparison, in the past it didn't feel like that with many other Party officials. The thing is that - along with the wealth redistribution aspects of the communist path - Mr Xi also seems to believe that this means thrusting the Party back into most aspects of daily life, as the only realistic way of achieving what needs to be done.
Kids are being lazy, wasting away their youth playing video games? Party to the rescue: three-hour gaming limit. Teenagers having their minds poisoned with silly, idol-worshipping television? Party to the rescue: "sissy looking" boys banned from programmes. Demographic time bomb ticking: Again, the Party has the solution: Three-child policy for all! Football, cinema, music, philosophy, babies, language, science… the Party has the answers.
To try to understand what has made Xi Jinping the leader he is today you have to take a look at his background. His father, Xi Zhongxun, was a Communist Party war hero, known as a moderate, who was later purged and imprisoned in the Mao era. At the time Mr Xi's mother was forced to denounce his father.
After his father's official rehabilitation in , he pushed for economic liberalisation in Guangdong Province and reportedly defended one of China's most progressive leaders Hu Yaobang. Given the persecution of Mr Xi's father at the hands of Communist Party zealots, given his father's inclination towards reform, many have asked why Xi Jinping now seems to be taking the Party in a direction which would appear to be at odds with his father's beliefs? Perhaps he simply disagrees with his father's line on certain political matters.
Or maybe China's leader intends to pursue a plan which, while different in emphasis to the priorities of his father, will not end up anywhere near the policies of the Mao era. At least not intentionally. When his father was sent to prison, Xi Jinping, at the age of 15, was made to go to work in the fields for years, living in a cave house.
These tumultuous times clearly toughened him up but could just have easily transformed into a hatred of politics, especially of a hard-line variety. Some China watchers have speculated that he perhaps believes that only a strong leader can guarantee that China will not return to the chaos of the s and 70s.
Additionally, participants posited that China enjoys greater soft power through various instruments of attraction and persuasion across the globe compared to India. Participants argued that this power gap hampers cooperation and compromise, since China does not consider accommodation of the Indian position necessary, while India fears the reputational costs of appeasement. Overcoming Obstacles to Cooperation: Participants argued that the perception of security as a zero-sum game impedes deeper cooperation between the two countries.
They explained that the idea that concessions and compromise could garner mutually enhanced security has not been internalized in either India or China. They emphasized that cognitive dissonance embedded in both political systems preserves pre-existing assumptions and, thus, bolsters this view of security.
They suggested instilling checks and balances in the political systems to overcome such cognitive dissonance and break away from this zero-sum view of security. Additionally, participants argued that India should strive to overcome the increasing power asymmetry which encumbers the political will of both countries to arrive at concessionary agreements. To this end, participants posited that a civilizational change is necessary in India.
They concluded that to engage with China and other great powers on the same plane, India had to galvanize social changes in its domestic realm to foster a healthy, literate, and educated population. This event summary was prepared by Shivangi Seth, a research intern at Carnegie India. Missed the event? Sign up to receive emails from Carnegie. Sign up for future event invitations.
His areas of interest include international security, Indian foreign policy and national security. It is pertinent to note that Doklam is located at the tri junction of India, Bhutan and China, which lends it immense strategic significance.
The Doklam incident once again confirmed the Salami Slicing strategy of the PLA where they move forward in unexpected new areas and then inch backwards to reach somewhere halfway after prolonged negotiations, retaining some of the grabbed portion for themselves. Post-Doklam, there have been reports of PLA setting up permanent camps—which never existed before—in the area. Such advanced preparations surely give PLA an added advantage in case they decide to execute any aggressive design in future.
Indian security establishment needs to put counter-measures in place to prevent being caught off-guard, especially when a resurgent China has exhibited expansionist tendencies in the recent past. Although QUAD has not been declared as a security grouping, the navies of these countries often exercise together to prepare for eventualities that could need collective deployment.
But in case of any misadventure on land borders between India and China, India would have to deal with it on its own. Rules of engagement between two militaries at sea and on disputed land borders are different, which necessitate a totally different approach.
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