No grand, sweeping social visions for these folks. Their lives and actions are a process of cautious trial and error in search of something that works.
They are cautious because they have money and reputation at risk. But business risk is not the same thing as gambling risk. Business risk is a search for a win-win result. Gambling risk is strictly the search for a win-lose. Business people try to build something of value. Gamblers try to take something of value from another party, i. Business people are pragmatists because they search for something that works. You can suggest to your institution to acquire one or more ebooks published on OpenEdition Books.
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Desktop version Mobile version. Pragmatist truth: Cash value or i The pragmatists on truth: common features. From the value of truth to truth as a value and as a norm. Search inside the book. Table of contents. Cite Share. Cited by. Chapter 2 Pragmatist truth: Cash value or ideal value? The main objections Index Text Notes. Index terms Keywords : pragmatism , truth , utility , verificationism. Full text. First objection: truth as utility 1 James, P , p.
If the principle of bivalence holds, then ev Notes 1 James, P , p. Read Open Access. Freemium Recommend to your library for acquisition. Pragmatist truth: Cash value or ideal value? ISBN: Tiercelin, C. The main objections. Tiercelin, Claudine. The Pragmatists and the Human Logic of Truth. By Tiercelin. New edition [online]. Size: small x px Medium x px Large x px.
Catalogue Author s Publishers Selections Excerpts. In All OpenEdition. Then there is the matter of appealing to raw experience as a source of evidence for our beliefs. According to the tradition of mainstream empiricism from Locke to Ayer, our beliefs about the world ultimately derive their justification from perception. Sellars, Rorty, Davidson, Putnam, and Goodman are perhaps the best-known pragmatist opponents of this foundationalist picture.
More generally, pragmatists from Peirce to Rorty have been suspicious of foundationalist theories of justification according to which empirical knowledge ultimately rests on an epistemically privileged basis—that is, on a class of foundational beliefs which justify or support all other beliefs but which depend on no other beliefs for their justification. Pragmatists resemble Kant in yet another respect: they, too, ferociously repudiate the Lockean idea that the mind resembles either a blank slate on which Nature impresses itself or a dark chamber into which the light of experience streams.
What these august metaphors seem intended to convey among other things is the idea that observation is pure reception, and that the mind is fundamentally passive in perception. Here, in other words, the knower is envisioned as a peculiar kind of voyeur: her aim is to reflect or duplicate the world without altering it—to survey or contemplate things from a practically disengaged and disinterested standpoint. Not so, says Dewey. For Dewey, Peirce, and like-minded pragmatists, knowledge or warranted assertion is the product of inquiry, a problem-solving process by means of which we move from doubt to belief.
Inquiry, however, cannot proceed effectively unless we experiment—that is, manipulate or change reality in certain ways. Since knowledge thus grows through our attempts to push the world around and see what happens as a result , it follows that knowers as such must be agents; as a result, the ancient dualism between theory and practice must go by the board.
This repudiation of the passivity of observation is a major theme in pragmatist epistemology. According to James and Dewey, for instance, to observe is to select—to be on the lookout for something, be it for a needle in a haystack or a friendly face in a crowd.
Hence our perceptions and observations do not reflect Nature with passive impartiality; first, because observers are bound to discriminate, guided by interest, expectation, and theory; second, because we cannot observe unless we act.
But if experience is inconceivable apart from human interests and agency, then perceivers are truly explorers of the world—not mirrors superfluously reproducing it. And if acceptance of some theory or other always precedes and directs observation, we must break with the classical empiricist assumption that theories are derived from independently discovered data or facts. Again, it is proverbial that facts are stubborn things.
If we want to find out how things really are, we are counseled by somber common-sense to open our eyes literally as well as figuratively and take a gander at the world; facts accessible to observation will then impress themselves on us, forcing their way into our minds whether we are prepared to extend them a hearty welcome or not. Facts, so understood, are the antidote to prejudice and the cure for bias; their epistemic authority is so powerful that it cannot be overridden or resisted.
This idea is a potent and reassuring one, but it is apt to mislead. According to holists such as James and Schiller, the justificatory status of beliefs is partly a function of how well they cohere or fit with entrenched beliefs or theory.
But this venerable view is vague and beset with problems, say pragmatists. Not as copying, surely; but then how? What sense, then, can be made of the suggestion that true thoughts correspond to thought-independent things?
Some pragmatists have concluded that the correspondence theory is positively mistaken and must be abandoned. Others, more cautious, merely insist that standard formulations of the theory are uninformative or incomplete. Apart from criticizing the correspondence theory, what have pragmatists had to say about truth? This view is easy to caricature and traduce—until the reader attends carefully to the subtle pragmatist construal of utility.
What James and Dewey had in mind here was discussed above in Section 2a. As Rorty sees it, his fellow pragmatists—James, Dewey, Peirce, Putnam, Habermas, and Apel—all err in thinking that truth can be elucidated or explicated. As this difference of opinion suggests, pragmatists do not vote en bloc. There is no such thing as the pragmatist party-line: not only have pragmatists taken different views on major issues for example, truth, realism, skepticism, perception, justification, fallibilism, realism, conceptual schemes, the function of philosophy, etc.
That question is wide open. Douglas McDermid Email: dmcdermi trentu. Pragmatism Pragmatism is a philosophical movement that includes those who claim that an ideology or proposition is true if it works satisfactorily, that the meaning of a proposition is to be found in the practical consequences of accepting it, and that unpractical ideas are to be rejected.
By the end of , proto-democratic institutions and rules were in place. Although it would be unrealistic to classify Eritrea as a democracy at this stage, the 'requirements' for such a system, as outlined by Robert Dahl , are present, albeit with some restrictions.
The absence of credible opposition forces capable of challenging the current regime's legitimacy has buttressed the stand taken by the EPLF Eritrean People's Liberation Front leadership.
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